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Summary
The aim of this study was to identify difficulties and barriers to reporting clinically
suspect situations, possibly caused by avian influenza (AI), and to explore
possible incentives to reporting such situations, with the ultimate aim of
facilitating early detection of AI outbreaks. Focus group sessions were held with
policy-makers from the competent authority, representatives of veterinary
practitioners and poultry farmers. Personal interviews with a group of poultry
farmers and practitioners were held to ascertain the difficulties and barriers they
perceived and their proposed solutions. An electronic questionnaire was put on
the websites of a poultry farmer union and the Royal Dutch Veterinary
Association to investigate perceptions and attitudes concerning AI-suspect
situations in the Netherlands. Six themes emerged identifying factors that hinder
the reporting of a clinically suspect situation: lack of knowledge and uncertainty
about clinical signs of AI; guilt, shame and prejudice; negative opinion of control
measures; dissatisfaction with post-reporting procedures; lack of trust in
veterinary authorities; lack of transparency in reporting procedures and
uncertainty about the notification process. Recommendations to facilitate early
detection of AI are discussed.
Keywords
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Introduction
Outbreaks of notifiable animal diseases (NADs), such as
notifiable avian influenza (NAI) have large societal and
personal consequences. Livestock farmers and veterinary
practitioners are at the frontline of surveillance, and hence
it is widely recognised that they play a key role in detecting
and reporting suspicions of the occurrence of NADs (6). In
theory, notification of contagious livestock diseases by
farmers to the competent authority can be an effective early
detection tool. Therefore, formal rules for reporting
clinically suspect situations in livestock by farmers and
veterinary practitioners are laid down in national 
and international legislation all over the world. In the
Netherlands it started with the Dutch Cattle Act, which
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a) increased mortality
– in layers, reproduction birds or broilers: 0.5% mortality
or more per day for two consecutive days 
– in turkeys: 1% mortality or more per day for two
consecutive days
– in AI susceptible birds: 3% or more mortality per week.
Poultry farmers have to consult their veterinary
practitioner if they observe increased mortality in 
AI susceptible birds
b) a clinical problem
c) a reduction in feed intake or water intake of 5% or more
per day for two consecutive days
d) a reduction in egg production of 5% or more per day for
two consecutive days.
Investigation of the scarce empirical data on 
delayed reporting and under-reporting of clinically suspect
situations shows that the problem thus far has mostly been
approached as a technical veterinary problem (18). 
Only recently have psycho-social factors such as the
behaviour, attitude and perception of farmers and
veterinary practitioners become the focus of interest as
possible predictors of delayed reporting (23, 25, 30).
Increasing the reporting rate and shortening the delay in
reporting are crucial. Finding ways to do this is
complicated by the fact that little is currently known about
the way farmers behave in clinically suspect situations,
more specifically, about their perception and appraisal of
the situation, the decision processes they follow, and the
intentions and behaviours that flow from these perceptions
and decisions.
The purpose of this study was to identify what poultry
farmers, veterinary practitioners and the competent
authority perceived as barriers (and possible solutions for
those barriers) to reporting clinically suspect situations,
possibly caused by AI, with the ultimate aim of improving
early detection of AI outbreaks.
Methods
To learn more about why poultry farmers decide to report
or not to report clinically suspect situations, possibly
caused by AI, the study combined qualitative and
quantitative research. For the qualitative part of the study,
the authors used participatory epidemiology methods (26):
focus group sessions were held with stakeholders to detect
patterns and trends, as follows:
– policy-makers from the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture,
Nature and Food Quality, which is responsible for animal
health policy and regulation (four people);
officially came into force in the year 1870 (43). It consisted
of a list of contagious diseases such as rinderpest, anthrax,
rabies and foot and mouth disease. Furthermore, 
it contained regulations for the obligatory reporting of
affected and suspect livestock to the mayor of the
municipality by farmers and veterinary practitioners, 
the isolation of sick and suspect livestock, the prohibition
of transport of these animals, etc. In essence, not much has
changed with respect to the reporting and eradication
process for NADs since those early days. Yet, we cannot
conclude that the regulations produce a desirable effect: in
spite of strict rules and regulations, experience has shown
that the time between the first clinical appearance 
of AI and the actual reporting by farmers of clinically
suspect situations to the competent authority is often too
long. This time lag results in extensive spread of the disease
to other farms because control measures are not put in
place in time (7, 8, 14).
Syndromic surveillance
Syndromic surveillance is the practice of tracking disease
in a population using health-related data that do not allow
for a definitive diagnosis of specific disease conditions but
signal a sufficient probability of a case or an outbreak to
warrant further investigation (10). In a syndromic
surveillance system, clinical signs are grouped into disease
syndromes on the basis of a common organ system 
(e.g. respiratory disease), a common clinical feature 
(e.g. progressive mortality, decreased feed intake) or a
common likely cause (e.g. influenza-like disease).
Populations are surveyed for disease syndromes of interest,
and further epidemiological or diagnostic investigation is
performed when the rate of a particular syndrome exceeds
a certain predetermined threshold (4). Because they track
information that is available before definitive diagnoses of
specific disease conditions can be made, syndromic
surveillance programmes typically allow anomalies in
disease trends to be detected more rapidly than would be
expected with methods that rely on obtaining a definitive
diagnosis (15, 16, 17, 42). Analyses of the H7N7 highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic in the
Netherlands in 2003 showed that increased mortality,
decreased feed and/or water intake and a drop in egg
production are excellent disease syndrome surveillance
indicators (14, 17). After an analysis of the H7N7 HPAI
epidemic, specific syndromic surveillance notification
thresholds were established (15). These surveillance
thresholds were incorporated into European Commission
Decision 2005/734/EC (20) and the Dutch Ministerial
Regulation ‘Prevention, eradication and monitoring of
contagious animal diseases, zoonoses and TSEs’ to 
provide an early detection system for AI outbreaks (35).
Article 89 of the Ministerial Regulation stipulates that 
a poultry farmer has to report the following to the
competent authority: 
– representatives of the Food and Consumer Product
Safety Authority, which is responsible for the actual
emergency response when a suspicion is reported or an
outbreak is detected (two people from the head office with
responsibility for disease eradication);
– board members of the livestock sections of the Royal
Dutch Veterinary Association (six people: livestock
practitioners with an interest in veterinary policy-making);
– board members (poultry farmers) of the two poultry
farmer unions present in the Netherlands (two people). 
Subsequently, personal in-depth interviews with five
randomly selected poultry farmers and four poultry
veterinary practitioners were held to check if there might
be other difficulties or barriers, solutions and incentives
with respect to reporting clinically suspect situations, as
suggested in the focus group meetings. Some of the
interviewees had experienced an AI outbreak in their
neighbourhood in the past (not necessarily on their own
farm) and a few of them had been visited by the competent
authority after a suspect clinical situation had been
reported. Based on the results of the qualitative research,
an electronic questionnaire was posted on the website of a
poultry farmer union for several weeks. The questionnaire
was also posted on the website of the Royal Dutch
Veterinary Association for three weeks, inviting veterinary
practitioners that work with poultry to respond. The
questionnaire was subdivided into four sections. Section A
asked when and under what conditions they would report
a clinically suspect situation. Section B asked about the
feelings and (economic) consequences they expected after
reporting a clinical suspicion. These questions were
formulated both for the case in which, retrospectively,
clinical signs would indeed turn out to be caused by AI
(true positive), as well as the situation in which,
retrospectively, it would become clear that they were not
caused by AI (false positive). Section C asked about
barriers to reporting, and Section D asked about opinions
on national regulation explaining when and how to report
a clinically suspect situation. The questionnaire did not
just probe into possible difficulties, but also possible
solutions to breaking down the barriers.
A grounded theory approach (37) was used to analyse the
content of focus group and in-depth interviews. Each
discrete incident, idea, or event was given a name or code
word that represented the concept underlying the
observation. Coded data were then isolated, reviewed, and
interpreted line by line, to form categories and sub-
categories until theoretical saturation was assumed (31).
Finally, categories and sub-categories were integrated to
form substantive themes. Overall, six themes emerged
from the data. With respect to the electronic questionnaire,
relative differences in opinions and attitudes between
veterinary practitioners and poultry farmers were tested
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A summary of items indicated by the competent authority,
veterinary practitioners and poultry farmers as factors that
prevent the reporting of clinically suspect situations,
possibly caused by AI, is shown in Table I. In Table II, a
summary of possible solutions to the problems
surrounding reporting, put forward by the focus groups, is
shown. After triangulating the responses of the competent
authority, veterinary practitioners, representatives of
farmer organisations and poultry farmers in the focus
groups and in-depth interviews, six themes emerged across
all groups.
Theme 1: lack of knowledge and uncertainty 
about the clinical signs of avian influenza
Specific syndromic surveillance reporting thresholds were
set after the H7N7 HPAI epidemic in the Netherlands in
2003 (35). However, the responses of poultry farmers
indicated that they did not agree with these thresholds.
Poultry farmers did not understand why they should
report clinical signs that they interpreted as being linked to
other diseases or other causes. Furthermore, from the
discussion it became clear that many poultry farmers only
assume that there is an AI problem if the mortality is
exponentially increasing, a sign which is linked to HPAI.
They do not recognise low pathogenic avian influenza
(LPAI) to be a problem for poultry farmers.
Theme 2: guilt, shame and prejudice
Public opinion and social norms were identified by farmers
as significantly influencing their practice of biosecurity.
Farmers interviewed in the study felt that if they reported,
and especially if they were the first farmer to report, other
farmers might think they had done something wrong. This
relates to Theme 1, namely, many people have erroneous
opinions on how diseases spread. A reflection from the
focus group meeting was as follows: ‘Many people would
agree that farmers with poor hygiene who have illegal
practices run a higher risk of introducing an animal disease
onto their farm. Hence people who admit they may have
an animal disease on the farm are afraid others may think
they are unhygienic and have illegal practices’. A farmer
commented that farmers who are the first to report ‘should
be made heroes in the public opinion instead of criminals’.
On the same theme, many farmers expressed their
dissatisfaction with what they called the obtrusive ‘circus’
of procedures after reporting. They were referring to the
visits of the specialist team of veterinarians and
governmental officials that investigate the seriousness of
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Table I
Reporting clinically suspect situations, possibly caused by avian influenza, on poultry farms: 
difficulties and barriers identified by three focus groups 
Difficulty/barrier
Focus group
Veterinary authorities Veterinary practitioners Poultry farmers
Difficulties with Unfamiliarity with clinical signs of AI, There is a large grey area, e.g. increased There are clear rules with respect to reporting
risk assessment especially among farmers and veterinary mortality combined with non-specific a situation without clear clinical signs but
practitioners with only a few poultry clinical signs. There are several (non- with increased mortality, decreased feed
farmers as clients. More problematic if defined) factors playing a role in the intake or a dip in egg production. However,
last outbreak is some time ago. Farmers decision process to report a suspicious poultry farmers do not agree with these
perceive that there is a higher risk of AI situation. Even with very high mortality, rules. Poultry farmers do not see why they
on their neighbour’s farm than on their some farmers do not think there is a should report such situations when they
own farm real problem encounter signs they judge as being linked to 
other diseases or other causes. The veterinary 
practitioner is indeed the first one to be 
consulted in such situations by the farmer, 
but in practice the veterinarian will almost 
never be consulted
Characteristics of disease The higher the probability of infection, 
the faster a practitioner would report. 
When there are no outbreaks in 
neighbouring countries, the probability 
of infection is perceived to be low
Negative consequences Both for farmers and veterinary The social consequences are high when
practitioners. They are both vulnerable  a false alarm is raised (strangers on the
due to specialisation. When there is a  premises, large amounts of paperwork). 
real outbreak, limitation of movement In general, farmers are not very willing 
or stamping-out policies applied in the to spend money on veterinary supervision, 
neighbourhood may lead farmers to feel especially if it concerns the protection
guilty for having reported the suspicion of the interests of the poultry industry as 
a whole rather than their own personal 
interest
Guilt, shame and prejudice Farmers having an outbreak of AI are Farmers do not want to have strangers
perceived as being non-hygienic and are with unfamiliar cars on their premises
suspected of having used illegal practices to be seen by the neighbours or have 
the mayor of the town visiting them 
for a serious talk
Earlier experience There is an association between earlier If a practitioner has never reported If there has been experience with AI outbreaks
with reporting negative experiences and the tendency a suspicion before, they do not know in the neighbourhood,farmers are more
to not report quickly what to do and/or what will happen inclined to report. Self-experience with an 
AI outbreak will increase alertness. However,
there are many negative experiences
communicated via informal channels picked 
up by non-experienced farmers
Negative image and mistrust Farmers and veterinary practitioners Perceived unfairness with respect to the Veterinary authorities have a negative image
of veterinary authorities have a negative image of the veterinary reporting station. The person answering among poultry farmers: no poultry expertise
authorities due to experiences with the phone at the reporting station has and sometimes a detached and arrogant 
procedural mistakes and lack of expertise no veterinary knowledge. It is not possible attitude
of veterinary officers to discuss the situation with them to 
try to come to a mutually satisfactory 
conclusion. The state veterinary officer 
visiting the farm is sometimes not 
competent. State veterinary officers 
are not always sufficiently aware 
of appropriate hygiene standards
Unclear procedures Procedures are particularly unclear Lack of transparency about the clinical
for non-experienced practitioners situations in which exclusion diagnostic tests 
can be used (without isolation of the farm)
Lack of recognition The consciousness of veterinarians of There is only a small core group of active
of the ethical component the ethical component of their work often veterinary practitioners in the field that is
of veterinary work begins to decrease the day they leave concerned about this item
veterinary school and start working in  
a veterinary practice
Conflict of interest Farmers may postpone a report of a The interest of the individual farmer
suspect situation until a planned shipment (economic) versus public health interests;
of poultry has been delivered; they may the interest of individual farmers versus
quickly ship-out birds when there are the interests of industry; conflicting
rumours of an AI outbreak. Farmers,  interests of the veterinary practitioner:
traders, and veterinary practitioners  integrity versus a good relationship
with farmers as clients all have  with client
strong personal interests
Non-transparent or In some sectors (e.g. dairy in the cattle
conflicting legislation industry, broilers in the poultry industry) 
with frequent contact between farmer and 
practitioner, unclear procedures or 
legislation is not a problem because the 
two parties can fix the problem together. 
In other sectors (e.g. layer sector) with less 
contact between farmer and practitioner, 
veterinary practitioners need all the support 
of the law not to surrender to the pressure 
of poultry farmers
Procedural injustice Veterinary authorities have started to ask for 
money for regular inspections on the farm, but 
they may have no specific poultry knowledge and
may not be able to judge situations on the farm 
properly; poultry farmers perceive this 
to be unfair
AI: avian influenza
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Table II
Reducing barriers to reporting clinically suspect situations, possibly caused by avian influenza, on poultry farms: 
solutions proposed by one or more focus groups
Solution
Focus group
Veterinary authorities Veterinary practitioners Poultry farmers
Shorter isolation period Already accomplished for AI because of A procedure for fast exclusion of a In theory, this is already accomplished,
the use of the PCR test in the framework possible notifiable disease causing a but in practice it does not always work that
of exclusion diagnostics suspect but non-specific situation must  way. Preferably the isolation period should
be made available be 24 hours, and certainly not longer
than 48 hours
Reduced social A minimum of publicity, no external signs Poultry farmers feel that after the 2003
consequences epidemic in the Netherlands this is not as 
important anymore; if it is a highly pathogenic 
AI outbreak everybody should be aware 
of the seriousness of the situation
Improved procedures Make it possible to have an alternative More communication of operational
way of reporting: exclusion diagnostics in procedures in peace time, not the first time
a situation with non-specific clinical  there is a real outbreak; procedures and
signs, without isolation of farm protocols should be more transparent; 
absolute guarantee that a false positive 
report will be cleared within a maximum of 
3 days. The procedures should allow for 
exclusion diagnostics to be used without 
the need to isolate the farm and with minimal 
costs for the individual farmer
Better diagnostic tests A more accurate and reliable diagnostic A fast diagnostic result after testing; If improved tests are available, this should
test is needed. It is not yet clear if this testing done by practitioners themselves; be communicated to farmers
should be made available on-site diagnostic testing to exclude a possible 
AI infection; availability of on-site tests
Better communication In the winter period, or when there More frequent consultation between Better communication is absolutely necessary; 
between authorities is a higher awareness due to outbreaks  authorities and the Royal Dutch Veterinary there is a need to improve the website of the
and farmers in neighbouring countries, have  Association about specific reports of veterinary authorities; protocols used should
presentations about notifiable diseases clinically suspect situations (debriefing) be transparent and farmers should be aware
and protocols of the content before they are used; specific 
legislation for farmers is difficult to access
Costs of testing not Start a campaign to promote use of PCR 
for individual farmer tests by veterinary practitioners and farmers
Financial reward to Reward a report from a communal fund 
support disease control (financed by industry and government)
Punishment Lift the cutback in compensation when 
administrative mistakes by farmers are 
ascertained during farm visits by authorities; 
punishment for administrative mistakes is 
very demotivating for the farmer and has 
led to many legal problems
Support for An intermediary, a service you could Annual extension/education programme about
veterinary practitioner contact to discuss your clinical findings disease in poultry
and to decide if you should report the 
situation to the authorities: an expert 
system or a competent person you could 
consult by phone (second opinion)
Support for farmer Internet-tools with pictures/video material on 
poultry diseases (avian influenza and 
Newcastle disease among others)
Ethical consciousness Refresher courses for veterinary Distribution of information on ethical 
practitioners problems via the newsletters of poultry 
producers; scientific meetings on this 
subject among veterinary specialist groups
Anonymous ‘squeal’ Will not work, everybody will cover for Do not report without telling the farmer, 
phone line each other otherwise you will lose their trust; reporting 
without consent of farmer will create 
problems for the veterinary practitioner
More transparent Specific and unequivocal legislation (use 
and specific legislation practical field knowledge from veterinary 
practitioners)
AI: avian influenza
PCR: polymerase chain reaction
the report. In order to prevent the possible spread of AI,
these officials park their cars outside the premises, 
and walk to the farm wearing white protective suites and
carrying red suitcases with sample materials and
instruments. In the densely populated agricultural areas in
the Netherlands it is easy to spot at least half a dozen farm
houses in the flat scenery, which means that the village
knows about a possible suspect situation within no time.
Individual farmers accused each other of giving their own
farm interest priority over sector interest. ‘When farmers
suspect animal diseases, they just quickly sell their suspect
animals to the slaughterhouse and wait at least a few days
before reporting, so that they can carry out important
deliveries before a possible isolation of the farm.’ During
group discussions, several individual farmers also admitted
that they had sold clinically suspect animals to the
slaughterhouse, but not to other farmers. In summary, fear
of destruction of personal image and being looked upon as
a criminal, and fear of deteriorating social networks were
among the reasons for not reporting possible early cases 
of AI.
Theme 3: negative opinion on control measures
Farmers held the opinion that the control measures
applied by government officials in the Netherlands are long
and tedious. After notification, in some cases, if animals are
tested to exclude AI, the farms may be isolated until test
results are announced. This normally takes less than 
48 hours. However, on some occasions it may take longer,
and the majority of farmers who had not had any personal
experience with reporting an AI-suspicion all knew this.
Dutch farmers do not receive compensation for losses
suffered during this period of examination after the
notification, although farmers said that the ‘reward’ 
of notifying AI as quickly as possible is that the financial
compensation for further consequences, such as the need
for eradication if there is indeed an NAI-infection, may be
higher: healthy animals that are eradicated are fully
compensated and sick animals are compensated at 50%.
Animals that die from the disease are not compensated.
Theme 4: dissatisfaction with 
post-notification procedures
Several farmers who had experiences with reporting to the
competent authority about clinically suspect situations
were not satisfied with post-notification procedures. After
notification, a team of three veterinarians visits the farm.
These include the veterinary practitioner of the farmer, a
veterinarian of the Animal Health Service (a private, profit
organisation), and a state veterinarian. In some instances in
the past, state veterinarians who may not always have the
necessary specific knowledge – had made a bad impression
by showing this lack of knowledge. In addition, farmers
were dissatisfied if officials had displayed ‘detached and
arrogant attitudes’, and spent most of the time writing
instead of personally talking to the farmers. Although in
many cases farmers praised the professionalism and
attitude of the specialist team, in some cases state
veterinarians were perceived by farmers as people with
limited knowledge on animal disease control. These
experiences had a de-motivating rather than a stimulating
effect on farmers and they did not feel encouraged to
report the next possible case of AI they came across.
Theme 5: lack of trust in government bodies
Farmers not only know the state veterinarians from
notification procedures, but also from other contacts, such
as commodity inspections and eradication campaigns.
Most officials currently are aware of the sensitive nature of
the procedure after reporting, and are especially trained to
deal with farmers’ uncertainties and emotions while
performing their duties. Their attitudes during commodity
inspections, however, may be totally different, which
relates to the different role they are fulfilling during these
activities. Farmers sometimes do not discriminate between
these roles, and know governmental officials only in their
corrective role of commodity inspectors.
In addition, the results indicate that farmers have concerns
about earlier animal disease interventions by government
bodies. Farmers felt that during past animal disease
eradication campaigns they were pushed aside and they
were not in control of their business anymore. 
Moreover, common to all the farmers was the belief that
disease prevention measures launched by government
bodies were not consistent and hence not fair. They felt
that the government was often giving priority to trade and
economic interests. Overall, many farmers currently have a
lack of trust in government officials and as a result find it
difficult to accept that government could or would work
together with farmers to control AI. This will be a challenge
for both the government and farmers.
Theme 6: lack of transparency 
in notification procedures and uncertainty 
about the reporting process
Farmers lacked insight into reporting procedures and,
perhaps more importantly, the process that would follow
notification. The uncertainty about how long the farm
might be closed, already mentioned under Theme 3, is but
one example of the uncertainty about possible
consequences of a notification. Tension caused by
uncertainty starts with the fear of the test result. Farmers
hope for negative test results, but once they have notified
the competent authority, they often expect that the test
results will be positive. Farmers expressed the need for a
website that they could regularly visit to check the progress
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of the notification, or a phone number that they could call.
This uncertainty is also reflected in the complaints about
specific steps in the reporting procedure, such as making
the first telephone call to the competent authority. In all
cases the farmers felt that the person answering the calls
needed to be an expert with whom they could discuss the
seriousness of their report. However, in practice the person
answering the phone is an administrator and not an animal
disease expert.
Transparency and confidence in the information that is
presented are prerequisites for controlling animal disease
outbreaks. Currently, farmers are hesitant in using formal
channels because they feel that these sources of
information are not up-to-date or reliable.
Questionnaire
A total of 33 poultry farmers and 334 veterinary
practitioners responded to the questionnaire. The results of
the quantitative study underscored the qualitative results.
However, in some instances poultry farmers and veterinary
practitioners differed significantly in their opinions and
attitudes towards reporting clinically suspect situations
(Table III). To highlight a few differences, although both
poultry farmers and veterinary practitioners were reluctant
to report false alarms, this tendency was stronger for
poultry farmers than veterinarians. For example, poultry
farmers wanted more certainty before reporting to the
competent authority. When asked: ‘if you thought that a
clinical problem on your farm might be caused by AI, how
certain would you want to be before you reported to the
competent authority?’ 27% of poultry farmers, compared
with 7% of veterinarians (2 statistic, P < 0.001) needed
more than 90% certainty. In addition, relatively more
veterinarians (72%) would seek a second opinion before
reporting it than would poultry farmers (55%), if they
thought there was a small chance of AI on the farm 
(P = 0.04). Relatively more poultry farmers (72%) than
veterinarians (49%) indicated that they would report
‘faster’ or ‘much faster’ a suspect clinical situation if clinical
signs of AI were more specific (P = 0.01). In addition,
relatively more poultry farmers (45%) than veterinarians
(13%) indicated that they would report ‘faster’ or ‘much
faster’ a suspect clinical situation if there was a strong
relationship between the poultry farmer and the
veterinarian (P < 0.001).
Relatively more poultry farmers (36% and 16%) than
veterinarians (5% and 5%) indicated that they would feel
‘awful’ and ‘ashamed’, respectively, if they reported a
suspicion which later proved to be a false alarm 
(P < 0.001). In addition, a total of 47% of poultry farmers
and 49% of veterinarians thought that reporting a suspect
situation which proved to be a false alarm, would result in
‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ consequences for the financial
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situation of the farm. A total of 44% of poultry farmers and
13% of veterinarians (P < 0.001) thought that reporting a
suspicion which later proved to be a false alarm would
create a ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ image of the farm.
Reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm was
expected by 12% of poultry farmers and 26% 
of veterinarians to have a negative effect on the relationship
between the veterinary practitioner and the client 
(P = 0.09).
Only 53% of poultry farmers and 43% of veterinarians
trust that all poultry farmers will do their utmost to prevent
an outbreak of AI in the poultry sector. Twenty per cent of
poultry farmers and 19% of veterinarians feel that it is
more terrible to report a suspicion that proves to be a false
alarm than to miss a real case of AI.
Poultry farmers (31%) and veterinarians (31%) alike
indicated that the fuss linked to reporting a suspect
situation is often a reason for not reporting such a
situation. However, the threat of paying a possible penalty
for negligence is perceived as an important reason to report
a suspicious clinical situation by 58% of poultry farmers
and 31% of veterinarians (P < 0.001). Guidelines in the
legislation and regulations explaining when and how to
report a clinically suspect situation possibly caused by AI,
are perceived as ‘clear’ by only 52% of poultry farmers and
33% of veterinarians (P = 0.03), and ‘well thought-out’ by
39% of poultry farmers and 24% of veterinarians 
(P = 0.05).
Discussion
Only 33 poultry farmers responded to the electronic
questionnaire, which was considered a low number (the
response rate was less than 5%, based on the number 
of members of the poultry farmer union). The response of
334 veterinary practitioners was good (a response rate 
of around 40%). The subject of reporting clinically suspect
situations possibly caused by NADs to the competent
authority is considered a very sensitive issue within the
poultry industry, and this might be an important reason
why not many poultry farmers responded to the
questionnaire. Another issue might be that not all of 
the poultry farmers had an internet connection.
Nevertheless, results of the quantitative study underscored
the result of the qualitative studies and the authors are
therefore confident that they have captured what is felt by
farmers and practitioners in the field.
If livestock farmers and veterinary practitioners are familiar
with the clinical signs of a NAD, they are in the best
position to detect NAD suspects. However, often these
diseases have not been in the country for many years or
sometimes even decades, and farmers and some veterinary
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Table III
Responses of Dutch poultry farmers (n = 33) and veterinary practitioners (n = 334) to a web-based questionnaire designed to
investigate perceptions and attitudes towards reporting clinically suspect situations, possibly caused by avian influenza
Response rate (%)
Difference between farmers 
Item / question and veterinarians:
Farmers Veterinarians (P-value of 2 statistic)
I have reported a suspicion of a notifiable disease to the Veterinary Authorities in the past 18 70 < 0.001
Conditions required for reporting a clinically suspect situation
If you thought that a clinical problem on your farm might be caused by AI, how certain would you 
want to be before you reported it?
≥ 50% 67 51 0.08
≥ 80% 33 20 0.08
≥ 90% 27 7 <0.001
If I thought there was a small chance of there being AI on my farm, I would wait a few days 39 54 n.s.
to see how the disease was developing before reporting
If I thought there was a small chance of there being AI on my farm, I would seek a second 55 72 0.04
opinion before I reported it
Farmers and veterinarians have a well thought-out plan in their head about how to react 53 49 n.s.
if they encounter an AI situation that must be reported
I would report a suspect clinical situation (much) faster if clinical signs of AI were more specific 72 49 0.01
I would report a suspect clinical situation (much) faster if there was a strong relationship between 45 13 <0.001
farmer and veterinarian
Feelings and economic consequences expected after reporting a clinical suspicion
After reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm I would feel awful 36 5 <0.001
After reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm I would feel ashamed 16 5 0.02
After reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm I would still think the report was useful 50 65 n.s.
Reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm would have (very) negative financial 47 49 n.s.
consequences for the farm
Reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm would create a (very) negative image of the farm 44 13 < 0.001
Reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm would have a (very) negative effect 12 26 0.09
on my relationship with my clients
Reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm would create a (very) negative image 9 30 0.01
of the veterinary practitioner
Reporting a suspicion which proved to be a false alarm would have a (very) negative influence 6 21 0.06
on the relationship between farmer and veterinarian
Barriers to reporting
I trust that all poultry farmers will do their utmost to prevent an outbreak of AI in the poultry sector 53 43 n.s.
The legal obligation to report a clinically suspect situation is the most important reason for reporting 41 39 n.s.
The fuss linked to reporting a suspect situation is often a reason for not reporting 31 31 n.s.
The difference in the compensation received for sick and dead animals is a good incentive to report 58 44 n.s.
The threat of possibly paying a penalty for negligence is perceived as an important reason 58 31 0.002
to report a clinically suspect situation
It is more terrible to report a suspicion which proves to be a false alarm than to have missed 19 20 n.s.
a real case of AI
The decision to report or not to report a suspicion of AI is totally in my hands 33 72 < 0.001
Opinion on national regulation explaining when, where and how to report a clinical suspicion
National guidelines explaining when and how to report a clinically suspect situation, are perceived as:
well thought-out 39 24 0.05
clear 52 33 0.03
There is a need for more information (website: photos, video) on AI characteristics 44 60 0.05
(clinical signs, transmission routes, etc.)
n.s.: not significantly different (P > 0.05)
practitioners do not recognise the associated clinical signs
anymore (14). Clinical signs of AI are often difficult to
distinguish from a large range of other poultry diseases
(38). After a considerable period of freedom from AI in a
country, farmers and veterinarians will have a tendency to
think that clinical signs observed are caused by an endemic
disease and not by AI. Consequently, farmers fail to
recognise the need to report these early clinical signs of AI
and as a result the disease agent may have time to spread
before the infection is finally detected (11). 
It is clear that laboratory testing of tissue or blood samples
for AI antigen or antibodies is necessary in order to exclude
AI being the cause of the clinical problems observed.
However, if samples are submitted for AI testing to the
Reference Laboratory in the case of a possible suspect
situation, the competent authority might think that if a
farmer is submitting samples to exclude AI this is actually
the same as a farmer having a suspicion of AI and so the
farmer should notify this suspicion. So, in the past, in 
the Netherlands, a poultry farmer could only ask for
laboratory confirmation after reporting to the competent
authority. Hence, asking for laboratory confirmation in the
Netherlands was linked to control measures, such as
isolation of the farm, until the results of diagnostic testing
were available. In Council Directive 2005/94/EC on
Community measures for the control of avian influenza
(21), Article 5 on ‘Notification’ indicates that Member
States shall ensure that the suspected presence or actual
presence of avian influenza is immediately notified to the
competent authority. The Council Directive does not
explicitly state that asking for laboratory confirmation
should be followed by notification of an AI-suspect
situation to the competent authority. The way in which the
competent authority interprets a submission of samples for
AI confirmation will depend on the trust they have in the
poultry industry. They will either view it as a suspect
presence of AI (and according to the Council Directive
2005/94/EC this would call for an immediate notification)
or as the use of exclusion diagnostics by the poultry
industry in a clinical situation in which AI is not the first
on the differential diagnosis list of possible causes. In the
last three years, the Dutch veterinary authority has
acknowledged the obvious need to allow the use of AI-
exclusion diagnostics in non-specific clinical situations
without involvement of the authority and without isolation
of the farm. Thus, an important tool to increase the
probability of early detection of a suspected case of AI has
been introduced. 
Farmers’ knowledge and awareness of the disease and 
their willingness to report the disease was called ‘vigilance’
towards disease by Hopp et al. (25). To increase their
vigilance, poultry farmers and veterinary practitioners have
called for up-to-date photo and video material of clinical
signs of AI to be made available via Internet. Summarising,
there is a need for continuous training of poultry farmers
and veterinary practitioners with respect to recognising
clinical signs associated with AI. This can partly be
facilitated by offering web-based information. While
providing this information, we should ensure that it shows
not only the typical high mortality caused by HPAI
infections but also the mild clinical signs associated with
LPAI infections.
Although specific rules were set with respect to reporting
an AI-suspect situation after the H7N7 HPAI epidemic in
2003 (35), poultry farmers indicated that they did not
agree with these rules. Farmers did not see why they
should report clinical signs that they interpret as being
linked to other diseases or other causes. This is an
indication of lack of ownership of the surveillance system
on the part of the poultry farmers. It is advisable that the
process of setting surveillance objectives should also
involve poultry farmers so that they gain mutual
ownership together with the competent authority (26).
In the case of, for example, a failing ventilation system
causing a temporarily high mortality, it is understandable
that the farmer would not report high mortality. However,
in the case of poultry diseases that produce similar clinical
signs to those produced by AI, it is irresponsible and risky
for farmers (and sometimes veterinary practitioners) to
make a diagnosis purely on the basis of observable clinical
signs. Only laboratory diagnostics are able to exclude AI as
a possible cause for the disease problems observed.
Furthermore, as stated earlier, discussions with farmers
revealed that unless there is a rapid increase in mortality,
which is an indicator that HPAI may be present, they will
not think that there is an AI problem. They do not
recognise LPAI to be a problem for poultry farmers. They
claim that it is actually not a real AI problem: it is
something created by politicians just to bother the farmers.
Because of that conviction, farmers are reluctant to report
LPAI outbreaks that produce clinical signs that are less
pronounced, with mortality that may only be increased
temporarily, even if a clear (but temporary in most cases)
dip in egg production and feed intake and/or water
consumption is seen. They seem to shut their eyes to the
fact that LPAI infections might be caused by an H5 or 
H7 subtype, which are now categorised as notifiable LPAI
(LPNAI) and are capable of mutating into HPAI. Another
issue is that in the layer sector in the Netherlands there is
almost no regular veterinary supervision, and health
problems are commonly discussed with technical/non-
veterinary advisers from poultry integrations or the 
feed industry.
Clearly, more communication about the risk of LPNAI
infections for the poultry industry is needed. Information
on this issue should not only reach poultry farmers and
veterinary practitioners, but should also be directed 
at technical/non-veterinary extension workers in the
poultry industry.
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It goes without saying that if there are disease-specific
clinical signs or other not-to-be-missed signs such as
progressive and exponential mortality, there should be
immediate reporting to the competent authority (17).
However, in practice, these black-and-white situations do
not often occur, and mild to moderate clinical signs caused
by LPNAI may be mistaken for clinical signs produced by
other poultry diseases. In these situations, a poultry farmer
and/or veterinary practitioner cannot totally rule-out 
AI solely on the basis of a clinical inspection. As syndrome
surveillance programmes clearly have advantages over
other diagnostic methods as a means of increasing the
probability of early detection (5, 28, 42), the authors
proposed that in the case of non-specific clinical signs,
possibly caused by LPNAI, veterinary practitioners should
be able to submit samples from selected birds 
to a Reference Laboratory without the involvement of the
competent authority and without isolation of the farm.
Recently, this recommendation was picked up and this
additional diagnostic tool is now operational 
in the Netherlands.
A total of 58% of responding poultry farmers in the
electronic survey indicated that the difference in 
the financial compensation received for sick and dead
animals is a good stimulus to report. Similar compensation
arrangements are also in place in most other countries.
However, despite the survey results, experience in the
Netherlands suggests that compensation is not a good
enough stimulus, because in the years after the 
H7N7 HPAI epidemic in the Netherlands there were
several cases of increased mortality in poultry, well above
the syndrome surveillance thresholds, that were only
reported several weeks after the onset of increased
mortality (1). In theory, compensation systems should be
effective in encouraging the reporting of HPAI outbreaks,
because one cannot miss the clinical picture of massive and
progressive mortality, but in the case of the H7N7 HPAI
epidemic in the Netherlands this was certainly not the case
(14). Furthermore, compensation seems to be particularly
ineffective as a means of encouraging the reporting of 
LPAI outbreaks, because LPAI outbreaks are not perceived
by poultry farmers as a serious problem. In order to
facilitate reporting of clinically suspect situations or
exclude AI as a possible cause for non-specific clinical
problems on poultry farms, it would help if tests to exclude
AI were offered free of charge to the individual poultry
farmer. These costs should be covered by the existing
communal Animal Health Fund (financed by contributions
from government [50%] and industry [50%]).
An important item arising from this study is the possible
value of decreasing the social consequences of reporting a
clinically suspect situation on poultry farms, for example,
by improving the public opinion of first reports.
Furthermore, there seems to be a need to counterbalance
the rumours and negative examples from the past that are
distributed among poultry farmers very efficiently by
hearsay and that stay in the memories of farmers for a long
time. The general opinion among poultry farmers towards
reporting clinically suspicious situations could be
influenced in a positive sense by an active media approach.
For instance, poultry magazines could regularly publish
case reports from poultry farmers that have had good
experiences of reporting such situations and of the post-
reporting process.
Another way of facilitating the early detection of LPAI is to
test samples from post-mortem material of chickens or
turkeys using a reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain
reaction test (12). Since 2007, veterinary poultry practices
and the Animal Health Service in the Netherlands have
been urged to submit throat and cloacal swabs from birds
presented for post-mortem examination in specific
circumstances. Since it is perceived as not being useful and
cost-effective to screen all post-mortem submissions, it is
recommended that swabs from birds with the following
post-mortem results be screened: 
– broilers with severe respiratory problems
– turkeys with severe respiratory problems or diarrhoea or
inflamed intestines
– layers with severe respiratory problems or mild to severe
peritonitis in combination with a dip in egg production
– all poultry types with no pathological findings during
post-mortem, but an anamnesis of slightly increased
mortality and/or a dip in production and/or a decrease in
feed and/or water intake.
This additional diagnostic tool to detect possible 
AI incursions is now operational in the Netherlands.
Farmers lacked insight into procedures for reporting a
clinically suspect situation and, perhaps more importantly,
the process that would follow after a notification. A high
level of transparency of the notification process, and what
to expect after notification would help to decrease the
uncertainty farmers feel. Furthermore, transparency with
respect to the notification process will help to build up
trust in the competent authorities among the farmer
community. It would be helpful to have a clear explanation
of the national guidelines explaining when, what and how
to report a clinical suspect situation, and a transparent
decision-tree on what to expect in the time after the
notification up to the final decision to either clear the farm
of suspicion or to isolate the farm because of a laboratory
confirmation of an AI-infection. This can be facilitated 
by the competent authority by providing web-
based information.
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One of the basic issues that underlie the problem of not
reporting clinically suspect situations is a low level of trust
in government bodies (23, 24). This is an item that also
arises from the present study and trust in each other might
prove to be a key issue (29) in trying to improve early
detection of AI. The lack of trust is associated with negative
personal experiences with the competent authority based
on responses by the government during NAD outbreaks in
the past. A study into Norwegian sheep farmers’ vigilance
in reporting scrapie-associated clinical signs (25) indicated
that reporting was dependent on both economic and non-
economic values. Being offered free examination of NAD
suspects was among the economic values considered
important by farmers. Knowledge of disease-associated
clinical signs by farmers and worries about blaming oneself
for experiencing the disease ranked high among the non-
economic values.
There seems to be a gap between what the competent
authority expects from poultry farmers and veterinary
practitioners regarding reporting a clinically suspect
situation and what poultry farmers and veterinarians really
feel is their responsibility. There is a common belief among
poultry farmers and farmer unions that AI is the primary
responsibility of the government. Changing such attitudes
and thinking will take a huge effort in communication and
time. Important requirements to achieve that goal are: a
credible communicator, a high level of similarity between
the audience (farmers) and the communicator, and finally
the message and the communicator must be perceived as
trustworthy (23). Since government bodies are not
perceived as highly credible and/or trustworthy by farmers
(3, 24, 32, 40), there is a specific need for an opinion
leader arising from the poultry industry to take on 
that challenge.
It appears that the relationship between farmer and
practitioner plays a role in the willingness to report a
suspect situation, and that there is also an area of tension
between farmer and veterinarian if it comes to reporting a
suspicion that proves to be a false alarm: ‘Do I (farmer)
trust the competence of my veterinarian?’ and ‘Am I
(veterinarian) losing a client (farmer) if my reporting turns
out be a false alarm?’ The present study indicates that
veterinarians have a more negative image of the
consequences of a false alarm for the relationship between
farmer and veterinarian than the farmer has. This calls for
recalibration of the relationship between veterinarians and
farmers by the veterinarians.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the authors believe that the study results are
applicable not only in the Netherlands but worldwide, and
that they are relevant not only for AI (2, 7, 8, 27, 33, 34,
41) but also for other notifiable animal diseases (9, 13, 19,
22). Future steps would be, among others, to make
available for Dutch poultry farmers up-to-date photo and
video material on the internet of the clinical signs of AI 
and Newcastle disease and endemic poultry diseases. From
the pig industry, there is already a good example of this
(visit www.varkensziekten.eu) and in Switzerland an
excellent DVD showing clinical signs of AI has also been
made available (39). Another useful step would be to build 
a module on the website of the Food and Consumer
Product Safety Authority that explains in a transparent way
the reporting process and what to expect after reporting.
An active media policy of publishing case reports of
poultry farmers who have had positive experiences should
be initiated, and from a scientific point of view it would be
interesting to measure if such a policy would have 
a positive effect on the willingness of farmers to report 
a clinically suspect situation to the competent authority.
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Déclarer ou ne pas déclarer : étude psychosociale destinée à
améliorer la détection précoce des foyers d’influenza aviaire
A.R.W. Elbers, M.J. Gorgievski-Duijvesteijn, K. Zarafshani & G. Koch
Résumé
Les auteurs présentent les résultats d’une étude conduite pour déterminer 
les difficultés et les obstacles qui freinent la déclaration d’incidents suspects
évocateurs de l’influenza aviaire, ainsi que les mesures incitatives à envisager
pour que ces évènements soient dûment notifiés, dans le but ultime de faciliter
la détection précoce des foyers d’influenza aviaire. Des séances de réflexion ont
été organisées avec les responsables de l’élaboration des politiques au sein 
de l’autorité compétente, ainsi qu’avec des représentants des vétérinaires
praticiens et des éleveurs de volailles. Des entretiens individuels avec 
des éleveurs de volailles et des vétérinaires ont ensuite permis de confirmer leur
point de vue sur les difficultés et les obstacles perçus, et de recueillir leurs
propositions de solutions. Un questionnaire électronique a été publié sur les
sites Web respectifs d’une organisation d’éleveurs de volailles et 
de l’Association vétérinaire néerlandaise afin de mieux connaître 
les perceptions et les comportements en cas de suspicions d’influenza aviaire
aux Pays-Bas. L’étude a relevé six raisons susceptibles de constituer un
obstacle à la déclaration d’une suspicion clinique : le manque de connaissances
et les incertitudes quant aux manifestations cliniques de l’influenza aviaire ; 
la culpabilité, la honte et la crainte des préjudices subis ; le jugement
défavorable porté sur les mesures de contrôle ; le mécontentement à l’égard des
procédures suivant la déclaration ; le manque de confiance en l’Autorité
vétérinaire ; le manque de transparence de la procédure de notification et les
doutes sur le processus de notification. Les auteurs examinent les conclusions
et les recommandations de l’étude sur les moyens de faciliter la détection
précoce de l’influenza aviaire.
Mots-clés
Influenza aviaire – Détection précoce – Facteur psychosocial – Notification d’un foyer de
maladie – Surveillance syndromique – Vigilance.
¿Notificar o no notificar? Estudio psicosocial destinado 
a mejorar la pronta detección de brotes de influenza aviar
A.R.W. Elbers, M.J. Gorgievski-Duijvesteijn, K. Zarafshani & G. Koch
Resumen
Los autores describen un estudio encaminado a determinar las barreras 
y dificultades existentes a la hora de notificar situaciones clínicamente
sospechosas, causadas quizá por la influenza aviar (IA), y a definir posibles
fórmulas para incentivar la notificación de tales casos, con el objetivo último 
de facilitar una pronta detección de los brotes de IA. Para empezar se
celebraron una serie de reuniones en forma de grupos de discusión con
References
1. Anon. (2005). – Not reporting increased mortality will
increase risk [in Dutch]. Agrarisch Dagblad, 23.
2. Barr D.A., Kelly A.P., Badman R.T., Campey A.R., O’Rourke
M.D. & Reece R.L. (1986). – Avian influenza on a multi-age
chicken farm. Aust. vet. J., 63, 195-196.
3. Bennet R.M. & Cooke R.J. (2005). – Control of bovine TB:
preferences of farmers who suffered a TB breakdown. 
Vet. Rec., 156, 143-145.
4. Borchardt S.M., Ritger K.A. & Dworkin M.S. (2006). –
Categorization, prioritization, and surveillance of potential
bioterrorism agents. Infect. Dis. Clin. N. Am., 20, 213-225.
5. Burns K. (2006). – Watching for signs, symptoms of disease:
syndrome surveillance might be a method for detecting
outbreaks sooner. J. Am. vet. med. Assoc., 228, 1846-1848.
6. Burrell A. (2002). – Animal disease epidemics: implications
for production, policy and trade. Outlook Agric., 31, 151-160.
7. Canadian Food Inspection Agency (2004). – Comprehensive
report on the 2004 outbreak of high pathogenicity avian
influenza (H7N3) in the Fraser Valley of British Columbia,
Canada (W. Lees, ed.). Available at: www.inspection.gc.ca/
english/anima/heasan/disemala/avflu/2004rep (accessed on 8
October 2009).
8. Capua I. & Marangon S. (2000). – The avian influenza
epidemic in Italy, 1999-2000. Avian Pathol., 29, 289-294.
9. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) (1999). – Outbreak of
Hendra-like virus – Malaysia and Singapore, 1998-1999.
Morb. Mort. weekly Rep., 48, 265-269.
10. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2008). –
Syndromic surveillance: an applied approach to outbreak
detection. Available at: www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/
syndromic.htm (accessed on 8 October 2009).
11. De Boer G.F., van Maanen C., Siebinga J.T. & Back W. (1992).
– Classic fowl plague (avian influenza) and milder influenza
infections in birds and mammals. Tijdschr. Diergeneeskd., 
117, 735-740.
12. De Wit J.J., Koch G., Fabri T.H.F. & Elbers A.R.W. (2004). –
A cross-sectional serological survey of the Dutch commercial
poultry population for the presence of low pathogenic avian
influenza virus infections. Avian Pathol., 33, 565-570.
13. Elbers A.R.W., Backx A., Meroc E., Gerbier G., Staubach C.,
Hendrickx G., van der Spek A. & Mintiens K. (2008). – Field
observations during the bluetongue serotype 8 epidemic 
in 2006. I. Detection of first outbreaks and clinical signs in
sheep and cattle in Belgium, France and the Netherlands.
Prev. vet. Med., 87, 21-30.
Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 29 (3) 447
planificadores de la autoridad competente y representantes de veterinarios
clínicos y productores avícolas. También se realizaron una serie de entrevistas
personales con un grupo de veterinarios y granjeros para dilucidar las
dificultades y barreras que a su entender existían y las soluciones 
que proponían. Además, se colgó un cuestionario electrónico en los sitios web
de un sindicato de productores avícolas y de la Asociación neerlandesa de
veterinarios con objeto de estudiar las percepciones y actitudes relativas 
a situaciones de presunta influenza aviar en los Países Bajos. Aparecieron seis
grandes tipos de factores que entorpecen la notificación de una situación
clínicamente sospechosa: falta de conocimientos e incertidumbre respecto de
los signos clínicos de la IA; culpa, vergüenza y prejuicios; valoración negativa 
de las medidas de control; insatisfacción con los procedimientos que siguen a
una notificación; falta de confianza en las autoridades veterinarias; falta de
transparencia en los procedimientos de notificación e incertidumbre respecto al
propio proceso. Los autores examinan una serie de recomendaciones
destinadas a facilitar la rápida detección de la influenza aviar.
Palabras clave
Detección rápida – Factores sociopsicológicos – Influenza aviar – Notificación de
enfermedades – Vigilancia – Vigilancia sindrómica.
14. Elbers A.R.W., Fabri T.H.F., de Vries T.S., de Wit J.J., 
Pijpers A. & Koch G. (2004). – The highly pathogenic avian
influenza A (H7N7) virus epidemic in the Netherlands:
lessons learned from the first five outbreaks. Avian Dis., 
48, 691-705.
15. Elbers A.R.W., Holtslag J.B., Bouma A. & Koch G. (2007). –
Within-flock mortality during the high-pathogenicity avian
influenza (H7N7) epidemic in the Netherlands in 2003:
implications for an early detection system. Avian Dis., 
51, 304-308.
16. Elbers A.R.W., Kamps B. & Koch G. (2004). – Performance of
gross lesions at post-mortem for the detection of outbreaks
during the avian influenza A virus (H7N7) epidemic in the
Netherlands in 2003. Avian Pathol., 33, 418-422.
17. Elbers A.R.W., Koch G. & Bouma A. (2005). – Performance
of clinical signs in poultry for the detection of outbreaks
during the avian influenza A (H7N7) epidemic in the
Netherlands in 2003. Avian Pathol., 34, 181-187.
18. Elbers A.R.W., Loeffen W.L.A., Dekker A., Koch G. & 
van Rooij E.M.A. (2006). – Substantial improvement of early
detection of notifiable animal diseases: a call for unorthodox
changes. In Proc. 11th International Symposium on
Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics, Cairns, Australia:
ISVEE 11. Available at: www.sciquest.org.nz (accessed on 
2 February 2010).
19. Elbers A.R.W., Stegeman J.A., Moser H., Ekker H.M., 
Smak J.A. & Pluimers F.H. (1999). – The classical swine fever
epidemic 1997-1998 in the Netherlands: descriptive
epidemiology. Prev. vet. Med., 42, 157-184.
20. European Union (2005). – Commission Decision
2005/734/EC of 19 October 2005 laying down biosecurity
measures to reduce the risk of transmission of highly
pathogenic avian influenza caused by influenza 
virus A subtype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to poultry
and other captive birds and providing for an early detection
system in areas at particular risk. Annex II. Off. J. Eur. Union,
L 274, 105-107.
21. European Union (2005). – Council Directive 2005/94/EC of
20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control
of avian influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EC. Off. 
J. Eur. Union, L 10, 16-65.
22. Gibbens J.C., Sharpe C.E., Wilesmith J.W., Mansley L.M.,
Michalopoulou E., Ryan J.B.M. & Hudson M. (2001). –
Descriptive epidemiology of the 2001 foot-and-mouth
disease epidemic in Great Britain: the first five months. Vet.
Rec., 149, 729-743.
23. Heffernan C., Nielsen L., Thomson K. & Gunn G. (2008). –
An exploration of the drivers to bio-security collective action
among a sample of UK cattle and sheep farmers. Prev. vet.
Med., 87, 358-372.
24. Hood B. & Seedsman T. (2004). – Psychosocial investigation
of individual and community responses to the experience 
of ovine Johne’s disease in rural Victoria. Austr. J. rural Hlth,
12, 54-60.
25. Hopp P., Vatn S. & Jarp J. (2007). – Norwegian farmers’
vigilance in reporting sheep showing scrapie-associated signs.
BMC vet. Res., 3, 34. Available at: www.biomedcentral.com/
1746-6148/3/34.
26. Jost C.C., Mariner J.C., Roeder P.L., Sawitri E. & 
Macgregor-Skinner G.J. (2007). – Participatory epidemiology
in disease surveillance and research. Rev. sci. tech. Off. int.
Epiz., 26, 537-549.
27. Li K.S., Guan Y., Wang J., Smith G.J.D., Xu K.M., Duan L.,
Rahardjo A.P., Puthavathana P., Buranthai C., Nguyen T.D.,
Estoepangestie A.T.S., Chaisingh A., Auewarakul P., 
Lomg H.T., Hahn N.T.H., Webby R.J., Poon L.L.M., Chen H.,
Shortridge K.F., Yuen K.Y., Webster R.G. & Peiris J.S.M.
(2004). – Genesis of a highly pathogenic and potentially
pandemic H5N1 influenza virus in Eastern Asia. Nature, 
430, 209-213.
28. Mariner J.C., Jeggo M.H., van het Klooster G.G.M., Geiger R.
& Roeder P.L. (2003). – Rinderpest surveillance performance
monitoring using quantifiable indicators. Rev. sci. tech. Off. int.
Epiz., 22, 837-847.
29. Palmer S.E. (2006). – To report or not to report: surveillance
from a social science perspective. In Proc. 11th International
Symposium on Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics,
Cairns, Australia: ISVEE 11. Available at: www.sciquest.org.
nz (accessed on 2 February 2010).
30. Palmer S., Tilbury F. & Sully M. (2007). – No worries mate:
West Australian farmers’ attitudes to infectious livestock
diseases. In Proc. 22nd European Society for Rural Sociology
Congress, Wageningen, Netherlands.
31. Patton M.Q. (2002). – Qualitative evaluation and research
methods, 3rd Ed. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks,
California. 
32. Poortinga W., Bickerstaff K., Langford I., Niewoehner J. &
Pidgeon N. (2004). – The British 2001 foot and mouth crisis:
a comparative study of public risk perceptions, trust and
beliefs about government policy in two communities. J. Risk
Res., 7, 73-90.
33. Selleck P.W., Arzey G., Kirkland P.D., Reece R.L., Gould A.R.,
Daniels P.W. & Westbury H.A. (2003). – An outbreak of
highly pathogenic avian influenza in Australia in 1997 caused
by an H7N4 virus. Avian Dis., 47, 806-811.
34. Sims L.D., Ellis T.M., Liu K.K., Dyrting K., Wong H., Peiris
M., Guan Y. & Shortridge K.F. (2003). – Avian influenza in
Hong Kong 1997-2002. Avian Dis., 47, 832-838.
35. Staatscourant (Government Gazette) (2005). – Ministerial
Regulation ‘Prevention, eradication and monitoring of
contagious animal diseases, zoonoses and TSEs,
TRCJZ/2005/1411 (7 June 2005).
36. Statistix for Windows (2000). – Version 7.0. Analytical
Software, Florida.
37. Strauss A. & Corbin J. (1998). – Basics of qualitative research:
techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory,
2nd Ed. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, California.
Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 29 (3)448
38. Swayne D.E. & Halvorson D.A. (2003). – Influenza. 
In Diseases of poultry, 11th Ed (Y.M. Saif, H.J. Barnes, 
J.R. Glisson, A.M. Fadly, L.R. McDougald & D.E. Swayne,
eds). Iowa State Press, 135-160.
39. Swiss Federal Veterinary Office (BVET) (2008). – Bird flu:
prevent it now! DVD produced by BVET, Bern, Switzerland.
Available at: www.bvet.admin.ch/dokumentation/02412/
index.html (accessed on 2 February 2010).
40. Van Haaften E.H., Olff M. & Kersten P.H. (2004). – The
psychological impact of the foot and mouth disease crisis on
Dutch dairy farmers. Neth. J. agric. Sci., 51, 339-349.
41. Villareal C.L. & Flores A.O. (1997). – The Mexican avian
influenza (H5N2) outbreak. In Proc. 4th International
Symposium on Avian Influenza, University of Georgia,
Athens, Georgia (D.E. Swayne & R.D. Slemons, eds). Georgia
Center for Continuing Education, 18-22.
42. Vourc’h G., Bridges V.E., Gibbens J., De Groot B.D., 
McIntyre L., Poland R. & Barnouin J. (2006). – Detecting
emerging diseases in farm animals through clinical
observations. Emerg. infect. Dis., 12, 204-210.
43. Wester J. (1939). – The fight against contagious animal
diseases between 1870 and 1900 in the Netherlands. 
In History of veterinary science (J. Wester, ed.). Hoonte
Publisher, Utrecht, 351-382.
Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 29 (3) 449

